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LABOR CZARS-COMMISSARS-KEEPING
WOMEN IN THE KITCHEN-THE PURPOSE
AND EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CHANGES MADE BY TAFT-HARTLEY
John E. Higgins, Jr.*
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)1 made a number of changes in the administrative structure of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and created a
new position-the General Counsel of the Board. This paper will ex-
amine some of these changes with particular emphasis on section 3(d),
which created the independent office of the General Counsel and man-
dated a statutory separation of the prosecutorial and adjudicative func-
tions under the NLRA.
The other structural and administrative changes mandated by the 1947
amendments were the increase, from three to five, in the number of
Board Members, the abolition of the Board's Review Section, and the
statutory prohibition that the Board not engage in economic analysis.
Each of these changes had a definite and significant purpose at the time,
but none has been as influential on American labor management rela-
tions as has the creation of an independent General Counsel. Each is, in
one way or another, connected to the title of this paper, and each refer-
ence will be described in turn.
The better known provisions of Taft-Hartley are outside the scope of
this paper because they represent substantive changes in the NLRA.
Clearly, the additions to the Act of injunctive authority (discretionary
10(j) authority and mandatory 10(l) authority), section 8(b), and of the
"right to refrain" as a section 7 right have had enormous implications for
the American workplace. But my assignment is to consider the adminis-
trative changes wrought by Taft-Hartley. The other changes are enticing
subjects but, quite simply, they are for another paper, not this one. Nor
is this paper intended as a detailed history of the NLRB, the Wagner
* Mr. Higgins is a career NLRB attorney. He has served in various capacities since
1964, including Field Attorney, Deputy General Counsel, Board Member, and Acting In-
spector General. Mr. Higgins is currently the Board Solicitor and is an adjunct member of
the faculty of the Columbus School of Law. The views contained in this paper are solely
those of Mr. Higgins and do not purport to be those of the NLRB.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994).
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Act, or Taft-Hartley. Others have done more complete work on those
subjects than I could ever hope to do. However, in order to understand
where the Board is today and to evaluate what the Board is doing, it is
necessary to touch on these histories.
I. THE Focus
Whether or not you label section 3(d) as a substantive or an adminis-
trative change or whether you call it a hybrid, the new office of the Gen-
eral Counsel and the statutory separation of functions are the most sig-
nificant of the changes wrought by Taft-Hartley. Indeed, it may be that,
notwithstanding the impact of unfair labor practice provisions regulating
unions on the labor management community, the powers that Taft-
Hartley granted to the independent General Counsel have had the great-
est implications of any of the 1947 amendments on the American work-
place and on American administrative law.
President Truman recognized the implications of this new position and
did not like them. In vetoing Taft-Hartley, he commented:
The bill would erect an unworkable administrative structure for
carrying out the National Labor Relations Act. The bill would
establish, in effect, an independent general counsel and an in-
dependent Board.... It would invite conflict between
the ... Board and its general counsel, since the general counsel
would decide, without any right of appeal ... whether charges
were to be heard by the Board.... By virtue of this unlimited
authority, a single administrative official might usurp the
Board's responsibility for establishing policy under the act.
In my view, the fifty-year experience with section 3(d) and its creature,
the General Counsel, clearly evidences that Truman was wrong in his
prediction. That experience is the subject of this paper.
The other administrative changes made by the 1947 amendments were
not as significant as the independent General Counsel, but they have ei-
ther served the Board well, as in the case of the increase in the size of the
Board, or they have not been a hindrance to Board operations, as in the
case of the limitation on economic analysis. In considering these changes
and their effects, I will draw upon the historical and legislative record,
the views of other commentators on the NLRA, and upon my thirty-
three years with the NLRB, twenty-four of which were spent in the office
of the General Counsel. Twelve of these twenty-four years were as Dep-
2. H.R. DOc. NO. 80-334, at 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 918 (1948) [hereinafter NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947].
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uty General Counsel. Whether that experience qualifies or disqualifies
me as a commentator, I leave to the reader.
II. THE NLRB's ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE-1935-1947
During the Board's first twelve years, it functioned very much like
other administrative agencies. Indeed, in its first Annual Report, the
Board commented that its administrative machinery:
follows closely the familiar provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, a procedural pattern which has been repeat-
edly approved as an appropriate and constitutional method for
the administration of Federal law.3
Under the Wagner Act, the Board was responsible for the investigation,
prosecution, and adjudication of unfair labor practices. The Board itself
had three members, but like other administrative agencies, no independ-
ent prosecutor. Thus, as the final authority within the Agency, Board
Members had, at least in theory, full authority for both the prosecution
and adjudication of unfair labor practice cases. In practice, however, the
Board sought to maintain an internal separation of these functions. For
example, the Board's Trial Examiners-now known as Administrative
Law Judges-were kept separate, both geographically and administra-
tively, from the field staff. It was the field staff, under the supervision of
a Regional Director, that investigated unfair labor practice cases and
made decisions on whether or not to issue unfair labor practice com-
plaints.4
Separation was in most cases effective, but it was by no means com-
plete. The Regional Director was under the ultimate supervision of the
adjudicating authority, and decisions not to prosecute were appealable to
the Board In 1939, the House of Representatives authorized "a
sweeping investigation" of the Board by the Special Committee to Inves-
tigate the NLRB. The Special Committee was created as a result of dis-
satisfaction with the Board during its first four years and the perceived
failure of the Labor Committees of both Houses of Congress to conduct
adequate oversight of the Board. The leadership of the American Fed-
3. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 11 (1936) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT].
4. See id. at 16.
5. See id. at 22. This appeal was not a direct appeal to the Board. There were in-
termediate levels between the field and the Board. In the final analysis, the Board re-
tained the right to decide to prosecute and then adjudicate that case. In fact, even after
the Board-initiated reforms of the 1940s, Board members continued to consider the ques-
tion of whether or not to issue complaints concerning "important policy issues." See Ida
Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation of NLRB Functions, 11 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 371,373 (1958).
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eration of Labor (AFL) had proposed amendments to the Wagner Act
because of their sense that the Board favored the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO). The AFL's efforts, together with those of the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, set the stage for the creation of the
Special Committee to study the Board.6
The Special Committee, usually referred to as the Smith Committee,
was under the chairmanship of Congressman Howard W. Smith of Vir-
ginia. Its deliberations were to be quite influential in the amendments of
1947, and its intermediate and final committee reports contain a number
of allegations of misconduct and bias by Board personnel which
prompted action by the House of Representatives.7 In fact, the Smith
Committee's recommendation became the basis for a House bill passed
in 1940 that presaged the 1947 amendments. That bill, however, never
cleared the Senate Committee on Education and Labor.8 Most impor-
tant for our consideration is the Smith Committee's findings that the
Board's prosecutorial and adjudicative lines were sometimes blurred, or
that headquarters personnel whose duties were adjudicative often
adopted a prosecutorial role. In its Intermediate Report, the Special
Committee majority recommended a separation of functions by statute
with the appointment of a prosecutor to be called the Administrator of
the NLRB. 9
The Special Committee condemned the access to informal records by
both Associate Attorneys-attorneys who worked for the Chief Trial
Examiner and who reviewed intermediate reports for the Chief-and
Review Attorneys-attorneys who worked for the Board and whose du-
ties were to advise the Board on what position to take on appeals from
intermediate reports. The informal records were, in effect, raw case files
6. See JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937-1947, at 85-108 (1981) (pro-
viding an excellent description of the Special Committee's study of the Board).
7. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, H.R. REP. No. 76-3109, pt. 1, at 32, 41 (1941) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]; SPECIAL COMM. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO INVESTIGATE THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, INTERMEDIATE REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, H.R. REP. NO. 76-1902,
at 18, 28, 48 (1940) [hereinafter INTERMEDIATE REPORT].
8. See GROSS, supra note 6, at 206-11 (discussing the Smith bill); see also Gene S.
Booker & Alan C. Coe, The Labor Board and Its Reformers, 18 LAB. L.J. 67, 68 (1967)
(same).
9. See INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 89-90 (recognizing the Board's
failure to separate adjudicative and prosecutorial roles and proposing the Administrator
as a solution to their problem).
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containing material "of which the respondent company has no knowl-
edge and no possibility of access."10
The comments of the two minority members of the Smith Committee
strongly rebutted much of the majority's allegations. With respect to the
separation of functions, Representatives Arthur D. Healey and Abe
Murdock countered that the record contained only one instance of a Re-
view Attorney having access to an informal record, and this case only in-
volved the reviewing of a letter urging expedition in handling the case.
Further, as to discussions between Trial Examiners and Review Attor-
neys about cases, the Minority Report found only two instances, both of
which occurred in non-adversarial representation cases."
For all the frailties noted by the Smith Committee, in the view of at
least some commentators, the Board's efforts at separation of functions
in the years before the Smith Committee worked reasonably well. Two
contemporary commentators on NLRB operations noted that "the
Board has made a largely successful effort to perform a difficult assign-
ment by a procedure which, while minimizing the chance of mistake, fully
preserves the basic values of traditional judicial processes., 12 With re-
spect to the separation of functions, these commentators stated that "the
relations between the Board's examiners [Administrative Law Judges]
and its attorneys are ordinarily not sharply different from those existing
between many District Judges and United States Attorneys.",1
3
Nonetheless, after the Smith Committee's Intermediate and Final Re-
ports, the Board made further efforts at separating functions. It adopted
the recommendations of the Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure and developed procedures that attempted to isolate
the individual Board Members, at least as much as possible, from the
Board's prosecutorial arm.1 4 But as the debates and the legislation of
1940 and 1947 show, these efforts were not good enough for those seek-
ing change at the Board.
10. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 141. The Board's policy allowed Associate At-
torneys access to files while denying access to the Review Attorneys. See id.
11. See SPECIAL COMM. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO INVESTIGATE
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, INTERMEDIATE REPORT, MINORITY
VIEWS ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, H.R.
REP. NO. 76-1902, pt. 2, at 72 (1940) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT].
12. Walter Geihorn & Seymour L. Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations: An Ap-
praisal of Criticisms of NLRB Procedure, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 395 (1939).
13. Id. at 388.
14. See Klaus, supra note 5, at 373.
1998]
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III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES MANDATED BY TAFT-HARTLEY
A. The Board
Taft-Hartley effected three major changes in the administrative struc-
ture of the Board: it increased the number of Board Members from three
to five; it abolished the Review Section; and it prohibited the Board from
engaging in economic analysis. Each of these changes will be discussed
seriatim.
1. Increase in Size of the Board
The increase in size from three to five Members was probably the least
controversial aspect of the changes wrought by Taft-Hartley. President
Truman did not mention it in his veto message. In addition, throughout
the Senate debates, there was a recognition that the amendments, in
whatever form they emerged, would increase the volume of the Board's
work.15 Indeed, until the conference report, Senator Taft was advocating
a seven-member Board which would in turn work in two panels of three
members each.
On June 5, 1947, Senator Taft presented a summary of the conference
on the bill. He noted that the House version had been designed to create
a new three-member Board-the old Board was to be abolished and the
newly-created Board was to be limited to quasi-judicial duties. The Sen-
ate's position was a little less drastic. It proposed a seven-member Board
by simply adding four members, and did not abolish the old Board. The
conference decided to add two members, but not to abolish the old
Board as the House bill had sought.6
While the increase from three to five Board members appears to be an
obvious compromise between the House and Senate versions, there was
surprisingly little discussion of the size of the Board in the debates. Only
Senator Murray, an opponent of Taft-Hartley, had advocated a five-
member Board, because he believed that a seven-member Board would
15. See 93 CONG. REC. 1809, 1845 (Mar. 10, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 984 (remarks of Senator Morse); 93
CONG. REc. 4012, 4037-38 (Apr. 25, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1052 (remarks of Senator Murray); 93 CONG. REC. 4421, 4433
(May 2, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at
1201 (remarks of Senator Ball).
16. See 93 CONG. REC. 6395, 6442 (June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1538; see also Klaus, supra note 5, at 377 (discussing the
compromise reached by the conference committee).
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be unwieldy.17 Senator Ball, on the other hand, had argued for the addi-
tion of four members. Ball's view was not based on the increased work-
load implications of the amendments, but rather because "seven individ-
ual quasi-judicial officials are much less likely to become rabid
proponents of. a certain point of view than would be a group of three."18
Nonetheless, the increase in Board size was clearly designed to meet
the expected workload. There was also a recognition that increasing
Board membership would not completely solve the Board's workload
problems. Senator Murray observed in his analysis of the conference re-
port - a point that has been made by many Board Members and General
Counsels since 1947:
The real need sought to be met by the amendment increasing
the Board membership to 5 is the handling of a large volume of
cases and a consequent backlog of over 5,000 cases. This prob-
lem can best be solved by providing adequate appropriations to
permit employment of a staff adequate to meet the situation
rather than by enlarging the Board to an extent which may
make it unwieldy and which may interfere with efficient admini-
stration. 19
In the final analysis, and for whatever reasons may have motivated the
Eightieth Congress, section 4 of the Wagner Act was amended to in-
crease the Board from three to five members and to authorize the Board
to work in panels, meaning "to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise."20
2. Abolition of the Review Section
In its First Annual Report, the Board described the Review Section as
follows:
The Review Section, headed by the assistant general counsel,
assists the analysis of the records of hearings in the regions and
before the Board in Washington. It submits to the Board
opinions and advice on general questions of law and problems
-of interpretations of the act and the Board's rules and regula-
tions, and in response to inquiries from the regional offices
submits to the regional attorneys opinions on the interpretation
17. See 93 CONG. REC. 4012, 4037-38 (Apr. 25, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1052.
18. 93 CONG. REc. 4421, 4433 (May 2, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1201.
19. 93 CONG. REC. 6494, 6501 (June 6, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1576 (remarks of Senator Murray) (emphasis added).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1994).
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of the act as applied to specific facts. In collaboration with
other divisions it prepares, for submission to the Board, orders,
forms, rules, and regulations, and it engages in the research in-
21
cidental to the formulation of legal opinions.
The Review Section was a highly controversial part of the Wagner Act
Board's administrative structure. The Smith Committee Report found
that there was "a palpable lack of any kind of experience that would con-
stitute a qualification for competent review of legal problems arising
from labor relations under the Act."22 No doubt this inexperience both-
ered the Smith Committee, but it may also have been something of a pre-
text for dissatisfaction with the politics and gender profile of the Review
Attorneys. This is not to say that the Committee's concerns about the
politics were groundless. Indeed, there is ample evidence of actual
Communist influence, a condition that certainly warranted congressional
investigation." The gender profile is another matter. The minority
members of the Smith Committee noted that: "the first week of testi-
mony was devoted solely to questioning members of the Review Division
who were women. No explanation is given by the majority for this action
in singling out the women attorneys for investigation." 24 This concern
was not limited to the members of the committee's majority. Congress-
man Hoffman referred to the Review Division on the floor of the House
in 1939 as follows:
Those girls who are acting as reviewing attorneys for the board
are fine young ladies. They are good looking; they are intelli-
gent appearing; they are just as wonderful, I imagine, to visit
with, to talk with, and to look at as any like number of young
ladies anywhere in the country, but the chances are 99 out of
100 that none of them ever changed a diaper, hung a washing,
or baked a loaf of bread. None of them has had any judicial or
industrial experience to qualify her for the job they are trying to
do, and yet here they are-after all-good looking, intelligent
appearing as they may be, and well groomed all of them, writing
opinions on which the jobs of hundreds of thousands of men
depend and upon which the success or failure of an industriaP
enterprise may depend and we stand for it."
21. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
22. INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 46.
23. See GROSS, supra note 6, at 134-35 (discussing the contemporary left-wing or
communist political slant of the Review Division).
24. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 11, at 69.
25. See GROSS, supra note 6, at 182-83.
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Thus the reference in my title. The "Commissar" reference is, of
course, to the concerns of the Smith Committee concerning the left wing
and/or Communist activities among the Board's attorneys.
The Smith Committee also found that the Review Attorneys regularly
reviewed materials outside the record in preparing cases for the Board,
and that they overstepped the bounds of permissible conduct in that they
often acted more like prosecutors than like judicial clerks. The Taft-
Hartley Congress shared these views. Its solution was to abolish the Re-
view Section indirectly. The drafters wanted a Board that would func-
tion quasi-judicially. In short, the Board was to be like an appellate
court and, just as an appellate court does not have its own attorneys-
they work for individual judges-the Taft-Hartley Congress wanted
Board members to have their own attorneys.26 The solution was to
prohibit the Board from employing "any attorneys for the purpose of
reviewing transcripts of hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except
that any attorney employed for assignment as a legal assistant to any
Board member may for such Board member review such transcripts and
prepare such drafts." 7 In short then, the Board, as a Board, was not
permitted to have Board attorneys handle the kind of appellate review
work that had been done by the Review Section. Rather, the work was
to be done by "legal assistants" to Board Members-law clerks if you
will.
B. The Solicitor
While the attorney employment prohibition resolved the Review Sec-
tion issue, it created other problems. The Board recognized that it would
need legal advice, but section 4(a) seemed to preclude the Board having
an advisor.8 Therefore, even prior to the effective date of Taft-Hartley,
the Board designated Herbert Fuchs as its Solicitor.29 It also wrote to the
26. See 93 CONG. REC. 3829, 3837 (Apr. 23, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1011. Senator Taft commented that he
wanted these Board aides to function like Supreme Court clerks and wanted abolition of
the "anonymous" Review Section. See id., reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1011 (1948). Senator Ellender wanted to assure that Board
members would not all get the same recommendations from the Review Section. See.93
CONG. REC. 4115, 4143 (Apr. 28, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
1947, supra note 2, at 1078.
27. National Labor Relations Act § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994).
28. Cf Klaus, supra note 5, at 379 n.39 (noting the Board's need for legal advice);
Edwin A. Elliott, The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 Sw. Soc. SCI. Q. 107,
116 (1948) (discussing the role of the general counsel). Dr. Elliott was at the time Re-
gional Director of the Board's Fort Worth, Texas office.
29. Actually, Mr. Fuchs had been a Review Section attorney. Many of those attor-
neys, including Mr. Fuchs and Ida Klaus, were assigned to the General Counsel's office
19981
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Comptroller General of the United States asking for an opinion on
whether or not it could have a legal adviser. The response of the Comp-
troller General was that the appointment of a Solicitor was permissible
as long as the duties of the incumbent did not include reviewing tran-
scripts of hearings, preparing drafts of opinions, or reviewing trial exam-
iner decisions) °
It is interesting to note here that the Board apparently thought that its
Chairman might have powers that transcended the restriction on the ap-
pointment of attorneys. Thus, in the Board's letter to the Comptroller
General, it suggested that the Solicitor be one of the Chairman's legal as-
sistants and advise the Board in that capacity. That concept was re-
jected."
because the Board could no longer employ attorneys. Mr. Fuchs and Ms. Klaus were then
detailed back to the Board. That detail was later made permanent when the Comptroller
General approved the appointment of a Solicitor. Although the Comptroller General's
approval raised the question of whether the Solicitor would have to be under the "general
supervision" of the General Counsel because of the language in section 3(d), the Board,
for whatever reason, never asked for an opinion on this point from the Attorney General.
The General Counsel agreed that he would not supervise the Solicitor, and the Board
made the appointments of Mr. Fuchs and Ms. Klaus permanent details. See Klaus, supra
note 5, at 379 n.39; see also NLRB's Right to Legal Counsel of Its Own, 20 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 34-36 (1947) [hereinafter Right to Legal Counsel] (providing the correspondence
between the Board and the Comptroller General).
30. See Right to Legal Counsel, supra note 29, at 34-36.
31. See id at 35. There is no discussion in the Act as to what the duties and authori-
ties of the Chairman were under either Wagner or Taft-Hartley. The practice of the
Board has been that the Chairman is the head of the Board, but that he or she has no
more authority under the Act than any other member. In 1950, Reorganization Plan 12
would have, inter alia, given the Chairman certain additional executive functions. See in-
fra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement between the General
Counsel and the Board on matters of enforcement). For other reasons, this plan was re-
jected. See Klaus, supra note 5, at 384. In 1979, Congress modeled the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA) after the Board. Its Chairman functioned just like the
NLRB Chairman until 1984 when Congress amended that statute to make the FLRA
Chairman that agency's "chief executive and administrative officer." 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b)
(1994). The absence of any such language in the NLRA along with the Plan 12 experience
clearly suggests that the NLRB Chairman does not have this authority. Congress noted
this again in the legislative history of the Inspector General Act, which indicates that while
the Chairman is "head of the Agency" for Inspector General Act purposes, the normal
reporting system for the NLRB Inspector General was somewhat different because of the
statutory role of the General Counsel. See Conference Report, Inspector Gen. Act: Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference, 100 Cong. 27 (1988). The actual
phrasing of the legislative history is "the Chairman shall exercise such authority consistent
with the past practices of the Board, which has been to balance the responsibilities of the
Board and the unique responsibilities of the General Counsel." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
100-1020, at 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3186.
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1. Economic Analysis
The Taft-Hartley amendments also provide that nothing in the NLRA
will be construed as authorizing the Board to appoint individuals to act
as mediators or as economic analysts. This language was a slight change
from section 4 of the Wagner Act, which provided that "[n]othing in this
Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for
the purpose of conciliation or mediation (or for statistical work), where
such service may be obtained from the Department of Labor. 32 The
1947 amendments deleted the reference to the Department of Labor and
the phrase "or for statistical work" and inserted the phrase "or for eco-
nomic analysis."33 The reference to the Department of Labor and media-
tion and conciliation made sense in the context of Taft-Hartley's other
provisions, because Title II thereof created the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, a new and independent agency separate from and
replacing the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor. '
The prohibition against economic analysis is another story altogether.
There is virtually no explanation of this restriction in the legislative his-
tory. One could surmise that such a prohibition made sense in light of
the congressional desire to make the Board like a court, meaning courts
do not have staff economists, so why should the Board. But that was not
the basis for this particular restriction. To understand it, we must return
again to the Smith Committee. Its Intermediate Report included a dev-
astating attack on David J. Saposs, the Director of the Board's Division
of Economic Research. The Committee concluded that Mr. Saposs was a
left wing radical-a Socialist and perhaps, it implied, a Communist.35 But
it was not Mr. Saposs's politics that expressly concerned the Smith
Committee as to the necessity or advisability of this Division. Rather,
the Committee complained that because Mr. Saposs would testify as an
expert witness on behalf of the Board, the Board was not only "prosecu-
tor, judge, jury, and executioner"36 but even acted as its own witness.
The Board abolished the Division of Economic Analysis in 1940, which
the Smith Committee cited as one of the Committee's "[c]oncrete
32. See INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 36.
33. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994).
34. Id. § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1994).
35. See INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 33-36. The evidence and the views
of those who knew Mr. Saposs are that he was not a communist but was a strong anti-
communist. See GROSS, supra note 6, at 134.
36. INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 34 (quoting Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,
109 F.2d 9, 19 (7th Cir. 1940)). The Committee borrowed this phrase from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, characterizing it as a condemnation of Mr. Saposs.
19981
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achievements. 3 7 Mr. Saposs left the Board in the early 1940s. Although
both the abolition and Mr. Saposs's departure were referred to in the de-
bates on Taft-Hartley by opponents of the economic analysis restriction,
the restriction was not taken out of the final bill. Taft-Hartley's oppo-
nents argued that an economic analysis restriction could only create fu-
ture problems for an agency whose basic work required it to make exten-
sive payroll and employment record examinations. Even though it was
undisputed that those examinations would continue to be an essential
part of the Board's work under Taft-Hartley,38 the opponents were not
successful in securing removal of the language. The drafters did, how-
ever, clearly state that the prohibition did not intend to limit Board
analysis of payroll records in its cases.
IV. FIFTY YEARS LATER-AN ASSESSMENT
President Truman issued an extensive and strongly worded veto mes-
sage on Taft-Hartley, but he was relatively silent about the proposed
changes in the provisions of section 4 of the Act. Indeed, in his message,
President Truman made no reference to the increase in Board size or to
the prohibition on economic analysis. There is a brief two-sentence ref-
erence decrying the abolition of the Review Section because, as he put it,
separate Board member staffs would result in a "costly duplication of
work and records.,
39
To the extent Truman expressed no objection to the increase in the
Board, he had it right. There was certainly a need for an increase in the
number of Board members and for authority for the Board to work in
panels. The workload of the Board has increased substantially since
1947. Although there are still regrettable delays in the processing of
those cases that go the full litigation route, the panel system has proven
an effective device in meeting the workload. The Board's resource
problem continues to be, not an inadequate number of Board Members,
but rather an insufficient staff to meet an increasingly difficult and com-
plex workload. 4°
37. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 151.
38. See 93rd CONG. REC. 4012, 4038 (Apr. 25, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1052 (1948) (remarks of Senator
Murray); S. MINORITY REP. NO. 80-105, pt. 2, at 33 (1947).
39. H.R. DOc. NO. 80-334, at 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF 1947, supra note 2, at 918.
40. There was an attempt in 1959 to increase the Board from five to seven members.
The House Committee voted out a labor reform bill that was opposed by the Republicans
and the Chamber of Commerce. Senator Goldwater inserted the Chamber's objection to
that bill in the Congressional Record. Of the seven-member Board, the Chamber com-
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The abolition of the Review Section and the increase from three to five
in the number of members of the Board would have been of little value
to the Board without the authority to work in panels. Clearly, that has
been the salvation of the system. There are five panels, with three mem-
bers comprising each panel; no two panels are composed of the same
members. Each Board member heads one panel, and is a member of two
other panels. In general, cases are decided by the full five-member
Board only if they present novel or unusual issues, require an interpreta-
tion for which there is no precedent, or involve questions of policy. The
remaining cases are decided by the Board panels.
The Board's policies with respect to the panel system assure that there
will be at least three members reviewing each case. The other two mem-
bers have an opportunity to review the work of a panel on which they are
not participating. If a member should decide that he or she wishes to
participate in that case, the member need only announce a wish to be on
the panel. In short, a member has an absolute right to join a panel.
Moreover, any member, regardless of whether he or she is on the panel
or not, may request that the matter be considered by all five Board
members.
The key to the Board's productivity success is collegiality. While there
have been inevitable conflicts between and among five Board members,
such conflicts are minor given the fifty-year history of Board members
working together to resolve the cases brought before the NLRB.
Taft-Hartley's Achilles heel is the appointment process. A fully
staffed, five-member Board is an effective and productive operation. In
the past twenty years, however, Board member turnover and delays in
appointments and in the confirmation process have kept the Board from
reaching its true potential. For example, during the 1980s, under a per-
fect appointment system, there should have been ten vacancies on the
Board-one each year. In fact, there were sixteen. 41 From March to No-
vember 1997, the Board operated with only three members, two of
whom, myself included, were recess appointees.
mented that it was a "superficial attempt to reduce the backlog of NLRB cases since seven
members instead of five would be required to review and consider policy issues." See id.
41. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS-THE STORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: 1935-1995, at 56 (1995). In fact, when I was
appointed by President Reagan in 1988, I was the fifteenth member to serve in the 1980s.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (granting the President the power to appoint
persons during a recess of the Senate to serve in a position until the end of the next session
of Congress).
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For a short period in 1993, the Board actually fell to two members, one
short of its statutory quorum.4 ' The problem is not one of recent vintage.
For example, from 1979 to 1983, the Board had a full five members for
approximately fifty percent of the time. For the balance of this time pe-
riod, the Board had only four members for about fifteen months and
three members for about seven months."
It would be an error to suggest that even with only three members, the
Board is not a productive organization. At the time I became a Member
in 1997, there was a four-member Board with 383 cases pending. With
the death of Member Margaret Browning, the membership was reduced
to three with 435 cases pending. When the Board went to a full five
members eight months later, the number of pending cases had increased
to 481. The increase of 46 in the Board's pending workload during that
time is in substantial part a result of this situation. Indeed, notwith-
standing this reduced number of members, the three member Board is-
sued a substantial number of decisions and the workload at the end of
that period amounts to an increase in the number of pending cases. It
should by no means be characterized as a backlog.
The abolition of the Review Section has presented no problem for the
Board. Indeed, the use of individual Board member's staffs resulted in
precisely what Congress wanted-a quasi-judicial Board that functions
similar to a court.
Finally, the restriction on economic analysis was, for all practical pur-
poses, a meaningless gesture in 1947 and has presented no difficulties in
the administration of the Act since then. The Division of Economic
Analysis had been defunct for seven years when Taft-Hartley was
passed. More importantly, however, the objections to the Board acting
as a witness in its own cases became a moot point with the creation of the
independent General Counsel. 46 Thus, any economist expert witness who
testifies for the government in an unfair labor practice proceeding acts as
a General Counsel witness rather than as a Board witness. While the
General Counsel has no economic analysis section on his staff, the eco-
nomic analysis prohibition is on the Board, not on the General Counsel.
43. During this period, the Board could not act on contested cases. Anticipating the
loss of a quorum, the Board delegated the section 10(j) authority to the General Counsel.
44. National Labor Relations Board Case Backlog (Part 2): Hearing Before a Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations of the House of Representitives, 98th Cong. 56-
57 (1984) (statement of Donald L. Dotson, Chairman of the NLRB).
45. I am dealing here solely with the number of cases, not with the age of some of
those cases. The age of the pending caseload is always a matter of concern and, as is so
often the case, there were during this period more old cases that anyone would like.
46. But see GROSS, supra note 6, at 264-67.
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Thus, when and if the occasion should arise, it may safely be assumed
that section 4 of the Act would not limit the General Counsel's choice of
witnesses.
Mr. Saposs's job description also provided that he furnish the Board
with "data and recommendations" about representation cases.47 How-
ever, the concerns of the Taft-Hartley Congress about the Board acting
as "prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner" would not apply to repre-
sentation cases. Nonetheless, the Board does not have a staff that testi-
fies in representation cases as did Mr. Saposs. There is nothing in the
legislative history to indicate that congressional concern went beyond un-
fair labor practice cases or that, if there was any concern at the time, it
continued after the separation of adjudicative and prosecutorial func-
481tions. On balance, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that this was
a purely political dispute that did not dissipate with the abolition of the
Economic Analysis Division in 1940.
A. The General Counsel
On October 5, 1987, in its first case for the 1987-88 Term, the Supreme
Court heard argument in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union (UFCW) .4' The case arose only slightly more than forty years af-
ter the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA. It centered on section
3(d) and its creation, the independent Office of the General Counsel.0
From the beginning, the Office of the General Counsel has been the
subject of scrutiny by students of administrative and labor law, litigants
in NLRB proceedings, the Board, and the courts." Although the Su-
preme Court has made passing reference to the Office of the General
47. INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 36.
48. Congress clearly wanted to isolate Board members from certain kinds of recom-
mendations in representation cases. Thus, the prohibition on hearing officers making rec-
ommendations on pre-election hearing matters was added to section 9(c). The provision
restricts the Board from making any assessment of credibility in these cases. There is no
explanation given for the restriction, although opponents of Taft-Hartley pointed out that
it was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedures Act. S. MINORITY REP. NO. 80-
105, pt. 2, at 34 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947, supra note
2, at 496.
49. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
50. See id. at 114.
51. See generally Michael C. McClintock, The Unreviewable Power of the General
Counsel-Partial Enforcement of the Labor Act, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 79 (1976) (discussing
the General Counsel's power to refuse to issue an unfair labor practice complaint); Jona-
than B. Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to
Issue a Complaint under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349 (1976-77) (discussing courts refusal
to review the General Counsel's decisions).
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Counsel and its powers 2 the case was the first occasion for the Court to
consider squarely the prosecutorial role of the General Counsel in the
statutory scheme of Taft-Hartley.
The narrow issue presented in UFCW was "whether a federal court has
authority to review a decision of the National Labor Relations Board's
General Counsel dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint pursuant
to an informal settlement in which the charging party refused to join."53
The Court's ruling sustained the broad authority of section 3(d) 4 and
generally silenced the remaining doubt concerning the likelihood of suc-
cess of any litigation challenging the General Counsel's "final authority"
under section 3(d) of the NLRA.
Nonetheless, dispute over the wisdom of section 3(d) remains. It be-
gan during the debates over Taft-Hartley and has continued over the
years. While UFCW settles the statutory issue, there is no reason to ex-
pect that the decision will do very much to quiet the debate concerning
the wisdom of unreviewability and the desirability of changing the stat-
ute. Indeed, unsuccessful charging parties will continue to argue that
they should be able to appeal an adverse decision by a General Counsel,
and students of administrative law will continue to seek appeal rights for
these charging parties premised on a belief that no government official
should have the "final authority" that a NLRB General Counsel pos-
sesses.
This section of this paper will examine the Office of the General Coun-
sel and consider how the position came about, how it has developed, and
assess how well it has functioned. As noted earlier, I was Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel from 1976 to 1988, serving three General Counsels and two
Acting General Counsels. That experience is, of course, a two-edged
sword. On the one hand, it offers a somewhat unique perspective of the
position. On the other hand, it does to some extent, at least during the
time I was Deputy General Counsel, result in a certain amount of self as-
sessment. I have made considerable effort to avoid the pitfalls of that
kind of assessment, and where my personal views are involved, I have at-
tempted to clearly indicate just what they are. At the same time as I said
at the outset of this paper, but repeat here because of its significance-to
paraphrase the great commercial law axiom-let the reader beware.
52. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (noting that the "General Counsel has
unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint").
53. See UFCW, 484 U.S. at 114.
54. See id.
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1. The History of the Office of the General Counsel
a. The Wagner Act-1935-1947
It must be confusing for the new student of the NLRA to observe that
the Office of the General Counsel was created in 1947, only to discover
that the Board identifies its first General Counsel as Charles Fahy, who
served in that capacity from 1935 to 1940. The explanation lies in the fact
that Wagner Act General Counsels served not as independent prosecu-
tors appointed by the President, but as Board appointees responsible to
it for "the legal work involved in the administration of the National La-
bor Relations Act., 5  A Wagner Act General Counsel was subject to
Board control and was responsible for the Board's Legal Division. Wag-
ner Act General Counsels were, in short, the Board's lawyers, not inde-
pendent prosecutors.
During the early Wagner Act years, the Board's Legal Division was
composed of a Litigation Section and a Review Section, with the former
responsible for providing advice to the Regional Offices on hearings be-
fore Trial Examiners and for representing the Board in court. In 1940, a
third section was created: the Trial Section. Its responsibilities were de-
scribed as "a miscellany of duties" ranging from "supervis[ing the] prepa-
ration and trial of cases in the regional offices" to maintaining "a compli-
ance unit and a staff of attorneys to handle miscellaneous legal problems
so that the Assistant General Counsel in charge may act as legal coun-
sellor to the Board in respect to such problems.
5 6
With the fifty years of hindsight of a clear Taft-Hartley separation of
the prosecutorial and adjudication functions at the NLRB, it is easy to
see the conflicts or, at a minimum, the apparent conflicts that could arise
with this kind of administrative structure. While those pitfalls prompted
the legislative changes in Taft-Hartley, the Wagner Act Boards were not
oblivious to the need for separating their functions. The natural sensi-
tivity to being prosecutor and judge was heightened by an unrelated 1938
Supreme Court decision in Morgan v. United States.57 The Court held
that an ex parte discussion between government prosecutors and the Sec-
retary of Agriculture concerning a matter under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act presented "a vital defect" in the administrative proceedings.
This sensitivity is exemplified by the Board's description of its adminis-
55. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
56. 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1941).
57. 304 U.S. 1 (1938), rev'd, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
58. See id. at 22.
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trative process in the Third Annual Report, stating that "[t]he Board it-
self decides whether complaints should be issued in only a very small
proportion of the cases, and then only if the preliminary investigation in-
dicates that the case involves a particularly difficult question of fact or
law or an important new application of the statutory policy."59 The
Board also stated that:
In this work [adjudication] the Board is assisted, as the Su-
preme Court has expressly said administrative agencies may be,
by a staff of lawyers under the supervision of an Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel. In deciding a particular case on the record there
is no consultation between the Board or its assistants, on the
one hand, and the attorney who tried the case or the trial ex-
aminer who heard it, on the other.60
The extensive hearings by the Smith Committee in 1939 and 1940 cov-
ered virtually all aspects of Board operations, but were centered on a
concern about separation of functions at the Board. The Committee re-
ferred to it as "the prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner" problem.
The Board made internal adjustments necessary to keep its prosecuto-
rial and adjudicative functions separate even though there was a belief
among some Board Members that there was only a limited need, if any,
to separate functions. For example, in a 1940 letter to John R. Connors,
a professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin, Board Member
William M. Leiserson commented that the call for a separation of the
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions:
[m]akes plain the basis misconception regarding the work of the
Board. As a matter of fact, we have neither prosecuting nor ju-
dicial powers. We are really a branch of the Congress for inves-
tigation and finding purposes similar to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.... The Board and its lawyers can't seem to
grasp this idea. Essentially they really agree with the Smith
Committee that we do have prosecuting and judicial functions.
Therefore their defense before the Smith Committee was that
the Board itself is very careful to keep in separate compart-
ments the prosecuting and judicial functions and not to mix the
two. I warned them that that kind of defense accepts the prem-
ise of the Smith Committee and they are bound to lose.61
Leiserson's letter to Connors acknowledged that the evidence before
the Smith Committee "showed many instances where what was consid-
59. 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1939) [hereinafter THIRD ANNUAL REPORT].
60. Id.
61. 18-24 Investigation of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearings Before the
Special Comm., 78th Cong., at 4977, Ex. # 1607 (1940).
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ered prosecuting was mixed with the so-called judicial."62 Nonetheless
whatever Leiserson's views were, the Board itself recognized the prob-
lem, and at least from approximately 1938 forward, it made an effort to
separate its prosecutorial and adjudicative functions.63
In his testimony before the House Committee in 1947 on the proposed
amendments to the Wagner Act, Chairman Paul Herzog described the
practices of the Board in separating its functions. In Herzog's view, the
proposals requiring separation by a specific amendment to the NLRA
were unnecessary. As he saw it, the Board's separation policies were
consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946. Herzog viewed the specific targeting of the Board as taking "as its
premise that this Board is the single pariah, among all Government
agencies, where a merger of functions is not to be trusted."6 For Herzog,
there was no difference between the Board, on the one hand, and the In-
terstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, on the other. And yet, as Herzog
noted "no one has suggested the cleavage of these other agencies."65
Former Board Member Henry A. Millis made the same point in his
history of the Board's twelve years under the Wagner Act. Millis ac-
knowledged that mistakes were made, but that the real concern behind
the charge that the Board was "prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner"
was "a general attack upon the administrative agency system, not only on
the NLRB." 6 For Millis, the Board had made the right adjustments over
the years to protect its internal separation of functions "subject only to
the possibility of human error." 67 He viewed the Wagner Act period as
one in which the Board had "profited from its own study of its experi-
ence and from the criticisms in Congress and those of the Attorney-
General's Committee" and that "[i]t was highly significant that when the
Administrative Procedure Act was passed the Board was already meet-
ing most of its requirements." '
62. Id.
63. See THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 5 (discussing how the Board in-
vestigates complaints and maintains a separation of functions in that process).
64. Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on Bills to Amend
and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act, and for Other Purposes Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 80th Cong. 3190 (1947) (testimony of Chairman Paul Her-
zog).
65. See id.
66. HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY 66 (1950).
67. Id. at 67.
68. Id. at 239.
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Herzog's and Millis's views to the contrary, there is no question that by
1947, Congress saw the Board as requiring changes in its statutory struc-
ture. From its earliest days, the Board had been criticized as being "pro-
labor," and the ideological leanings of some of its staff had been carefully
scrutinized by its critics. Those leanings gave impetus to the drive to
make the Board a different kind of administrative agency and to sepa-
rate, in clear and unmistakable terms, its prosecution and adjudication
functions. For Herzog, this made the Board a "pariah" among adminis-
trative agencies, but it is, I believe, more accurate to consider it a natural
consequence of the highly charged nature of the field of labor relations.
Labor law is more than just "regulatory" as that term is used by other
administrative agencies, and parties to NLRB proceedings often have
very strong views about the effect of an adverse decision that transcends
even the economic consequence of that decision. It should not, there-
fore, have come as a surprise to anyone that the Board would be selected
as an experiment in administrative law.
b. Taft-Hartley-The Early Years 1947-1953
Despite the Truman veto, Taft-Hartley became law in August 1947.
Two new Board Members, Abe Murdock and J. Copeland Gray, joined
John M. Huston, James J. Reynolds, Jr., and Chairman Paul M. Herzog
to comprise the first Taft-Hartley Board. The first Taft-Hartley General
Counsel was Robert N. Denham.
One of the first acts of business for the new Board was to structure it
along the quasi-judicial lines mandated by the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus,
on August 22, 1947, it announced a delegation of authority to the Gen-
eral Counsel which both paraphrased and somewhat expanded section
3(d). 69 Through this action, the General Counsel, in addition to his
prosecutorial role, assumed compliance responsibilities and court litiga-
tion duties for injunctions, court enforcement, and subpoena enforce-
ment."' The General Counsel was also given responsibility for represen-
tation cases, liaison with other government agencies, and handling the
"non-communist" proceedings under sections 9(f), (g), and (h) of Taft-
Hartley. 1 Finally, the Board delegated to the General Counsel all gen-
69. It is really not accurate to characterize all aspects of "the Delegation" as an actual
assignment of duties by the Board to the General Counsel because section 3(d) gave him
the Act's investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Nonetheless, the Board in 1947 and
Agency personnel even to this day use the term in this manner.
70. See NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1948).
71. See id. (stating that the Board reserved the right to decide appeals in General
Counsel representation matters, while delegating all other authority to the General Coun-
sel).
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eral administrative duties, including budget and personnel.72 This "dele-
gation" was clearly an acknowledgment by the Board that its duties were
quasi-judicial in nature. As one of its long-time Regional Directors
wrote at the time, the Board's action was a recognition of
[T]he Congressional intent that their functions henceforth must
be confined to the judicial area of activities.... It was a com-
plete cleavage of jurisdiction, and an absolute separation of the
judicial from the prosecution side .... [P]erhaps eighty per cent
of the personnel and activities of the agency ... rests in the
General Counsel exclusively. In this way, the criticism that the
Board is a combination of prosecutor, jury, and judge, has been
extinguished ......
The delegation also solved some of the anomalies of Taft-Hartley.
Thus, while the statute carried over the language of the Wagner Act that
made the Board the appointing authority, Taft-Hartley provided that at-
torneys and field personnel other than legal assistants were under the
General Counsel's general supervision. In 1953, Chairman Herzog de-
scribed the situation as the Board saw it:
The statute expressly provides that the Board shall hire all em-
ployees. The statute provides in section 3(d) that there shall be
a General Counsel. The hiring of employees by the Board ap-
pears in section 4(a). The statute contains some language
which, frankly, created a dilemma. It provided that the Board
should hire everybody, but where attorneys were concerned the
General Counsel should exercise general supervision.
The Board, in an attempt to make section 3(d) work as well
as possible, entered into a delegation agreement in 1947 with
the former General Counsel, slightly amended in 1950 on 2 oc-
casions, whereby we delegated to the General Counsel the
authority to hire attorneys and employees in the regional of-
fices, as well as to supervise them. It made no sense, as we
agreed with Mr. Denham, to have one outfit hire people and
14fire them, and another outfit conduct the supervision.
This recognition of a need to dovetail the roles of the Board and of the
General Counsel did not avert a conflict between those roles. The seeds
of the conflict are apparent from the statutory structure, and one need
72. See id. at 11.
73. See Elliott, supra note 28, at 116.
74. Labor-Management Relations: Hearings on H.R. 115 Before the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 83rd Cong. 259 (1953) (statement of Paul M. Herzog, Chairman,
NLRB); see also Klaus, supra note 5, at 378-79 (discussing the duties of the General Coun-
sel and the Delegation Agreement).
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only look at the language of the Act itself to see the potential for conflict
between a Board and a General Counsel. Senator O'Mahoney of Wyo-
ming predicted such a conflict during the Taft-Hartley debates:
[B]y the terms of the bill itself it becomes clear that the first ac-
tion under the bill will be the institution of a violent intra-
agency row between the newly established or expanded Labor
Relations Board and the newly created independent general
counsel of the Board. The bill ought to be called a bill to create
a labor czar and promote discord.
Senator O'Mahoney was only partially right. The discord was not the
first order of business for the Taft-Hartley Board and General Counsel,
but it was not long in coming. In fact, during its first two years, the
Board was periodically scrutinized by the Joint Committee on Labor
Management Relations, which was created by section 401 of Taft-
Hartley.76 The Board generally received good marks for carrying out
"the congressional intent of confining the Board to the functions of a
court, with duties of administration and supervision over regional offices
handled by the general counsel."'
The disagreement between the Board and the General Counsel, when
it came, centered on two issues: jurisdiction and the enforcement of
Board cases in the courts. The jurisdiction controversy arose when the
Board set its own jurisdictional standards, exercising its discretion not to
extend its jurisdiction as fully as it could. The Board decided that it
would not cover every labor dispute involved in interstate commerce, but
only those affecting employers whose business affected commerce at lev-
els decided by the Board.7 ' The Board's decision to limit its authority
was a matter of available resources. The General Counsel, however, be-
lieved he had a duty to prosecute cases even in situations which fell be-
low the lines at which the Board would exercise its jurisdiction.79 The
court enforcement dispute occurred because the General Counsel be-
lieved that his office had the responsibility not to argue positions in the
courts with which he personally disagreed.80
75. 93 CONG. REC. 7523, 7524 (June 23, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1947, supra note 2, at 1629.
76. The Joint Committee was charged with studying and investigating "the entire
field of labor-management relations" including the labor laws. See Labor-Management
Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 402, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
77. S. REP. NO. 80-896, pt. 3, at 8 (1948).
78. See Klaus, supra note 5, at 380.
79. See id.
80. This is a fascinating and defining period in Board history but it, like so many
other aspects of Board history, is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information,
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The final resolution of these disputes established that the Board sets its
jurisdictional standards, not the General Counsel. It was also clearly es-
tablished that when General Counsels appear in court, they do so as the
Board's lawyer and not in their section 3(d) "final authority" capacity."
In short, the Board, not the General Counsel, makes national labor pol-
icy, and it is the Board's position, not the General Counsel's, that is pre-
sented to the courts. The important point about these disputes is that de-
spite the enormous powers granted to the General Counsel under section
3(d), there are limits.
This conflict occasioned the Reorganization Plan Number 12, which
would have repealed section 3(d) and given the General Counsel's duties
back to the Board. The hearings before the Senate Committee on Ex-
penditures in the Executive Departments on Senate Resolution 298, Re-
organization Plan Number 12 of 1950 provide further information on this
dispute. Although Chairman Herzog endorsed the plan, it was defeated
and section 3(d) survived. In fact, the 1959 amendments, which created
the position of Acting General Counsel, are the only changes in this sec-
tion since 1947.
The conflict between General Counsel Denham and the Board re-
sulted in the Board writing to President Truman seeking his assistance in
the conflict. Almost immediately Denham was called to the White
House and "resigned." He later characterized the incident by saying that
he had been "fired." 82 No doubt, his resignation was requested, and he
complied.
After the Denham era, there were a few rough spots in the relationship
between the Board and the second General Counsel.83 But since that
time, there has, with a few exceptions, been a general acceptance of the
proper roles of the Board and the General Counsel. Thirteen years after
Taft-Hartley and ten years after Denham's resignation, General Counsel
Stuart Rothman commented that after the Denham era, "the administra-
tion of the act has, in general, proceeded smoothly."' 8 Professor Davis
commented twelve years later that:
see id. at 380-81.
81. See id. at 381.
82. Denham clearly did resign after being asked for his resignation. While section
3(d) does not explicitly set forth criteria and procedures governing this situation, the prac-
tice since 1947 has been that General Counsels serve four-year terms, and not at the
pleasure of the President. Thus, they can only be removed for cause.
83. See Klaus, supra note 5, at 382.
84. Stuart Rothman, The National Labor Relations Board and Administrative Law, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 301, 307 (1960-61).
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[S]uccessors to the original General Counsel have worked more
harmoniously with the Board. The experience seems to show
that complete separation may work tolerably well with conge-
nial personnel but can cause serious trouble when the personnel
are uncongenial."
c. Later Developments
There have been two additional significant events in the history of sec-
tion 3(d) since the early 1950s-the 1959 amendments and the Board's
decision in 1983 to attempt to obtain control and supervision of the Gen-
eral Counsel personnel involved in the court enforcement process.
1. The 1959 Amendments
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Lan-
drum-Griffin Act) amended section 3(d) to give the President the power
to appoint an Acting General Counsel in the event of a vacancy in the
position of General Counsel.86 There is no doubt that this legislation was
in response to the experience of 1957 when General Counsel Theophil C.
Kammholz resigned and Kenneth McGuiness was appointed as Acting
General Counsel. There was no statutory provision for such an ap-
pointment, and although McGuiness served only two months and his
tenure was not challenged, it was generally recognized that there was a
need to provide authority to the President to make such an appointment.
Indeed, during the debates over the 1959 amendments, Senator Ervin
characterized the Acting General Counsel provision as "the only non-
controversial proposal for the amendment of the Taft-Hartley Act."8
The President's authority to appoint an Acting General Counsel is
somewhat limited. The 1959 amendments limit the President to ap-
pointing an "officer or employee who shall act as General Counsel."' 8
This mandate requires that the Acting General Counsel be an employee
of the Board. Significantly, the legislative history suggests that the Presi-
dent's authority is even more limited than that. Thus, Senator Ervin
stated that the President could "designate an officer or employee of the
85. KENNETH GULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 13.03, at 259 (3d ed.
1972).
86. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 703, 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (1994).
87. 105 CONG. REC. 6249, 6286 (Apr. 20, 1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at
1048 (1959) [hereinafter NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1959].
88. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
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general counsel's office to serve as an acting general counsel."89 Al-
though Senator Goldwater later stated that the provision authorized the
designation of "an employee of the Board only," 9 appointments to Act-
ing General Counsel have assumed that it must be an officer or employee
of the General Counsel. In fact, the appointment of Acting General
Counsels by President Nixon and President Ford from the position of
Board Solicitor apparently relied on the fact that the Solicitor is an em-
ployee of the General Counsel on "permanent detail" to the Board.91
2. The Events of 1983
On May 4, 1983, the Board voted to take over supervision of the attor-
neys involved in court enforcement and to delegate that supervision to its
Solicitor. The proposal was never fully implemented, but it did occasion
hearings before a House subcommittee. The then General Counsel Wil-
liam A. Lubbers objected to the "repeal of the delegation," arguing that
while the Board had delegated the function of his office, it was a delega-
tion mandated by the NLRA because of the prohibition on employment
of attorneys by the Board. In short, if the Board took control of its en-
forcement program, it would be employing attorneys for purposes other
than reading records and transcripts, and thus would be in violation of
the restrictions of section 4. Lubbers argued that the language in section
4(a) providing that attorneys appointed by the Board "may, at the direc-
tion of the Board, appear for and represent the Board in any case in
court ' ' 2 was part of the Wagner Act and was carried over from that stat-
ute and was clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of Taft-
Hartley. He correctly noted that this provision makes sense only when it
is understood that it was included in the Wagner Act in order to permit
the Board to appear in court without having to go through the Depart-
ment of Justice. 93 The Board never fully implemented its May 4 decision.
89. 105 CONG. REC. 6374, 6411 (Apr. 21, 1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1959, supra note 87, at 1071. This was also the view of the Senate Commit-
tee. See S. REP. NO. 86-187, at 33 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF 1959, supra note 87, at 429.
90. 105 CONG. REC. APP. A8509, A8523 (Oct. 2, 1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1959, supra note 87, at 1857.
91. In 1970, President Nixon appointed Board Solicitor Eugene Goslee and in 1975
President Ford appointed Solicitor John C. Miller.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 154(a).
93. See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on La-
bor, 74th Cong. 19 (1935) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2493 (1959)
[hereinafter NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1935].
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2. The Office of General Counsel Today
Since Taft-Hartley, General Counsels have described themselves as
having three roles-the three hats of a General Counsel-prosecutor,
Board lawyer, and the Board's chief administrative officer. I will de-
scribe each of them in reverse order after first describing the General
Counsel's staff.
Immediately below the General Counsel is the Deputy General Coun-
sel. This position was created in 1971 and functions as a full deputy-an
alter ego-to the General Counsel. Reporting to the General Counsel
and Deputy are four Division chiefs-three of which are attorney posi-
tions: the Associate General Counsels for Advice, Enforcement Litiga-
tion, and Operations Management. The fourth Division chief is the Di-
rector of the Division of Administration. Also reporting directly to the
General Counsel is the Office of Appeals and the Office of Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity.
The Divisions of Advice, Enforcement Litigation, and Administration
conform generally to the three General Counsel roles. Thus, while Ad-
vice handles section 10(j) matters for the General Counsel, its primary
work is dealing with difficult and novel prosecutorial matters. Enforce-
ment Litigation, which includes the Appellate Court, Supreme Court,
Contempt, and Special Litigation branches, conforms generally to the
General Counsel's duties as the Board's lawyer in court. Administration
handles the administrative functions of the Board: personnel, data proc-
essing, government contracts, budget, finance, and the acquisition and
management of space. The Division of Operations Management super-
vises the field operations and coordinates the work of the other divisions
as that work relates to the field offices. The Office of Appeals handles
appeals from the decision of Regional Directors to dismiss unfair labor
practice charges and the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office
handles EEO matters for the entire Board.
B. Chief Administrative Officer
The General Counsel supervises all the traditional administrative du-
ties of a federal agency. He is, in a phrase, the NLRB's Chief Adminis-
trative Officer. In 1959, the Board commissioned a study of its case-
handling and administrative practices. Out of that study came a recom-
mendation that the General Counsel be made the NLRB's "single execu-
tive officer."94 While that is in fact the situation, it is not mandated by
94. 105 CONG. REC. APP. A4365, A4366 (May 25, 1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1959, supra note 87, at 1753.
[Vol. 47:941
Purpose & Effects of Changes Made by Taft-Hartley
law, as is the designation of the Chairman of the FLRA as that agency's
CEO.95 Nonetheless, that is how the NLRB functions and General
Counsels and Boards have accepted it as the single best way to run the
organization. They have accepted it perhaps because they have recog-
nized the truth in the old adage that a camel is a horse designed by a
committee. The five-member Board retains a policy-making role, but
day-to-day management and supervision lies with the General Counsel.
C. The Board's Lawyer
In this capacity, the General Counsel's legal staff represents the Board
in court. Whether in a District Court, Appellate Court, or the Supreme
Court, the General Counsel functions as counsel to the Board and oper-
ates within guidelines and policies developed over the years by the
Board.96 To assure that the General Counsel's prosecutorial and Board
lawyer roles remain distinct, General Counsels have traditionally main-
tained an internal separation of functions in their offices. Thus, En-
forcement Litigation work is handled by a separate staff which reports to
the General Counsel through its own hierarchy and not through senior
officials in the prosecutorial chain of command.
The enforcement and review work represents the greatest volume of
the General Counsel's Board lawyer duties. In fiscal year 1996, the Gen-
eral Counsel handled 125 enforcement petitions and 93 review matters.97
Enforcement petitions are filed after unsuccessful efforts at securing
compliance by the regions and by the settlement counsel in the Appellate
Court Branch. Within a median time of thirty-three to thirty-five days
after the matter is referred from the region, a petition for enforcement is
filed in the court. In a typical year, the Branch's very successful settle-
ment program will resolve forty percent of the Branch's contested case
intake (enforcement and review cases) through settlement of the compli-
ance issues.
One of the most difficult issues in appellate practice for the General
Counsel is determining whether a case should go back to the Board be-
95. See supra note 31 (discussing the duties and authorities of the FLRA Chairman
and the NLRB Chairman).
96. In litigation involving the General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion, the General
Counsel represents himself. Thus, a suit to compel issuance of a complaint where the
charge was dismissed would be a situation in which the General Counsel's lawyers are not
Board lawyers.
97. There is often an overlap between enforcement petitions and review matters.
Review cases are appeals filed by a party aggrieved by a Board decision. If a review peti-
tion is filed before the Board files an enforcement petition, the General Counsel, pursuant
to agency practice and policy, routinely files a cross-application for enforcement.
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fore it goes to court. Usually the problem arises when the Board does
not focus on a particular issue, fails to reconcile conflicting lines of
authority, or does not resolve or respond to a concern expressed about a
Board position by the circuit in which the petition will be filed.
As the Board's lawyer, the General Counsel has some discretion to
supplement the Board's decision. At the same time, the General Coun-
sel must avoid the danger of "post hoc" rationalizations, that is, the prac-
tice of counsel saying what the Board did not say. Courts have accused
the General Counsel of this in the past. 98 As a result, the lawyers in the
Appellate Court Branch are rightfully wary about saying more than the
Board said in its decision. Given the volume of cases the Board has in
the courts, the relatively few times that its lawyers have been criticized
for post-hoc rationalization clearly reflects the sensitivity of General
Counsel staff to this problem.
The Board has a long-standing practice of filing for enforcement in the
circuit in which the unfair labor practice took place.99 Where a party
seeks review in another circuit, the Board varies its practice and files a
cross-application for enforcement in the same circuit. Over the years,
these venue provisions have resulted in difficult forum problems for the
Board, specifically, whether the Board should routinely accept adverse
decisions of particular circuits when dealing with unfair labor practice
decisions arising in those circuits. In Arvin Automotive v. United Auto-
motive, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers Union, Local
759,'00 a divided Board debated this issue extensively. The majority took
the traditional Board position that acquiescence with adverse circuit
court law would be inconsistent with the venue provisions of the NLRA
by cutting off the rights of adversely affected parties to seeking review in
different circuits.
The Board's position on acquiescence vel non is clearly consistent with
Supreme Court certiorari policies. The Court, absent an unusually seri-
ous case, usually awaits conflict in the circuits before granting
certiorari.' If the Board simply accepted court decisions, it would never
98. See, e.g., NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 9 (1974);
NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1965); NLRB v. Indianapolis
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 802 F.2d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1986).
99. Section 10(e) of the Act provides that the Board can seek enforcement in the cir-
cuit in which the unfair labor practice took place, or the circuit in which the respondent
resides or does business. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994). Review petitions can be filed in
either of these circuits or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See id.
§ 160(f).
100. 285 N.L.R.B. 753 (1987).
101. See id. at 757-58.
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be in a position to obtain the conflicting circuit decisions necessary to ob-
tain Supreme Court review. The Board's experience with the Supreme
Court in the "right of control"'' 2 and "cup of coffee"'03 cases is testament
to the wisdom of this practice of the Board and its lawyer, the General
Counsel. °l This is not to say that the Board is not attentive to contrary
views of the circuits. It certainly is and has been. At the same time,
however, it is charged with fashioning a national labor policy, not a cir-
cuit-by-circuit policy. Consequently, when, after careful consideration of
a differing view of an issue by a circuit court, the Board decides to ad-
here to its original position, it does so consistent with Supreme Couit
certiorari practices, the venue provisions of the Act, and the need for na-
tional labor standards.
The Board is ultimately responsible for deciding these issues, but it is
the General Counsel and his or her staff that provides the legal advice on
the Board's choices in each case. As indicated, General Counsels have
separated their staffs in order to separate their Board lawyer and chief
prosecutor roles. A separation is also maintained in the Division of Ad-
vice, which has one branch for handling regular advice work (section 3(d)
prosecutorial decisions), and another branch for injunction litigation
work (Board lawyer section 10(j) cases).
Under section 10(j) the Board is authorized to seek interim relief pen-
dente lite in unfair labor practice cases. Not all cases meet the standards
for this kind of relief. The courts have described the section 10(j) tests as
comprising two prongs: 1) a showing of reasonable cause to believe that
there is a violation of the Act; and 2) a showing that injunctive relief
would be just and proper.105
102. See NLRB v. Enterprise Assoc. of Steam, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507
(1977).
103. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
104. For example, Ford Motor Co. and Enterprise and were two Supreme Court cases
which the Board won after losing the issue in a number of circuits. See Ford Motor Co.,
441 U.S. at 494, 503 (holding that in-plant food services and prices are mandatory subjects
of bargaining); Enterprise, 429 U.S. at 514, 521-24 (sustaining the Board's right of control
test). This experience has also occurred in a number of federal circuits. For example, two
circuits took different positions on attorneys' fees in Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)
cases against the Board when the Board continued to litigate on issues that the circuit had
previously decided adversely to the Board. Compare Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d
748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983) (sustaining an award of attorney's fees in an EAJA action), with
Wyandotte Sav. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982) (denying an award of
attorneys' fees in an EAJA action).
105. It is not the purpose of this paper to describe the Board and the judiciary's sec-
tion 10(j) tests. For the interested reader, compare Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19
F.3d 449, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no reasonable cause prong), with
Pascarell v. Vibra Screw Inc., 904 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying the traditional two
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The General Counsel handles the section 10(j) work under delegated
authority from the Board. In processing these cases, the General Coun-
sel first makes a section 3(d) decision whether or not to prosecute a given
case and then, if the decision is to prosecute, decides whether or not to
seek section 10(j) authority from the Board. When the decision is to
seek authority, the General Counsel, as the Board's lawyer, communi-
cates that request to the Board. The General Counsel alone does not
make the initial decision to issue the complaint in every section 10(j)
case. That decision is usually made by the regional director. But
whether the decision is made by the regional director or the General
Counsel, the communication with the Board concerning section 10(j) has
been challenged as an improper ex parte communication between the
prosecutor and the adjudicator. The Board's argument is that the Gen-
eral Counsel's role in these communications is that of the "Board's law-
yer," to his client and not as "prosecutor." This issue has been fully liti-
gated in the courts, which have consistently accepted that the statute,
section 10(j) procedures, and the Board's practices do not involve an
"improper combination of functions."
1
0
6
D. The General Counsel as the Board's Lawyer-An Assessment
The nature of the Board's work-labor relations law-is controversial,
and the Board policies under the NLRA will always draw criticism from
adversely affected parties. Similarly, General Counsel prosecutorial and
section 10(j) decisions can be, and often are, the target of complaints that
General Counsels are too aggressive or not aggressive enough. With re-
spect to the quality of the Board lawyer work and the commitment of
staff doing that work, however, there is general praise from the labor-
management community. Attorneys or respondents may not like the de-
cision that the Board made either in an administrative decision or in a
section 10(j) case, but they will seldom contend that the Board is not well
represented by its lawyer's efforts to implement the Board's decision in
the courts. There is similar acknowledgement of the quality of Con-
tempt, Special Litigation, and Supreme Court representation of the
Board by the General Counsel.
Board critics have argued that the Board does not perform as well as it
claims in the courts. This is a statistical debate, not one that goes to
whether or not the Board's lawyer is doing a good job in litigating Board
prong test for a 10(j) injunction).
106. See e.g., Kessel Food Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 868 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1989);
NLRB v. Sanford Home for Adults, 669 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1981); Holland Rantos Co. v.
NLRB, 583 F.2d 100, 104 n.8 (3d Cir. 1978).
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policy. Thus, whether or not the percentage of Board cases enforced in
full by the courts is too high because it does not isolate every issue in
every case is beside the point when the discussion is of the quality of the
representation the Board receives from its lawyer.
E. The Independent Prosecutor
The roles of Chief Administrative Officer or Board Lawyer are hardly
the stuff of a "Labor Czar." Neither is particularly powerful outside the
administrative structure of the Board. Rather, it is the "independent
prosecutor" role-the provisions of section 3(d) giving the General
Counsel "final authority" over the issuance and prosecution of unfair la-
bor practice complaints-that prompted the "Labor Czar" warning by
Senator O'Mahoney and the veto by President Truman. This authority,
together with the General Counsel's responsibility to provide "general
supervision" of all attorneys employed by the Board-other than ad-
ministrative law judges and legal assistants to Board members-and of
the officers and employees in the regional offices, makes the General
Counsel a most controversial position. The authority over investigations
and prosecutions makes a General Counsel very much like other public
prosecutors and rightfully gives the office the lion's share of the agency
staff and budget. For our purposes, it raises two important questions.
First, how have General Counsels handled these responsibilities? Sec-
ond, has this section 3(d) experiment in administrative law been success-
ful?
In my view, General Counsels have generally done very well and the
experiment has been a resounding success. This assessment is somewhat
subjective and based on the personal experiences of many years. Critics
often point to specific examples of what they consider-and I might even
agree-to be serious errors by General Counsels. But invariably these
instances are few and far between given the thousands of cases that Gen-
eral Counsels and their representatives have handled in the fifty years
that section 3(d) has been in force.
There is some objective evidence of the quality of the work of section
3(d) General Counsels. There are four areas which provide such evi-
dence: (1) the record of mandamus litigation against the General Coun-
sel; (2) the record of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) litigation
against the NLRB; (3) the General Counsel's merit factor; and (4) the
NLRB's settlement rate. No single one of these tells the entire story.
Indeed two of these areas-mandamus litigation and the EAJA-pro-
vide only neutral, if not negative, evidence. But taken together, they
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provide a reasonable record for evaluating section 3(d) and how General
Counsels and their staffs have implemented it.
1. Mandamus Proceedings
Occasionally a party will sue the General Counsel to compel complaint
issuance. Such a proceeding is not unlike a suit against a district attorney
attempting to force a grand jury proceeding. Similar to such proceed-
ings, the likelihood of success against the General Counsel is almost non-
existent. Indeed, in the fifty years of Taft-Hartley, no plaintiff has ever
successfully secured a court mandate compelling the General Counsel to
issue a complaint.' °7 Because the decision to issue a complaint vel non is
discretionary, the burden on a plaintiff is very high. The burden is so
high that the General Counsel's success rate in the defense of these cases
provides scant evidence of a General Counsel's performance. Manda-
mus cases, however, have the potential for drawing judicial criticism of
General Counsels regardless of whether the General Counsel wins or
loses. Such criticism may in turn, serve as the launching pad for legisla-
tive efforts to amend section 3(d). Beyond a few cases, however, neither
situation has occurred. While this is a record of limited value in an as-
sessment of section 3(d) and its implementation, it is a favorable record.
Perhaps the best way to state it is that the mandamus litigation record
does not reflect unfavorably on the fifty year existence of section 3(d).
2. The Equal Access to Justice Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) to
provide respondents in NLRB cases with attorneys fees for litigation if
they successfully establish that the government was not "substantially
justified" in its position in that litigation.'08 The EAJA is limited in its
coverage. It is applicable only to individuals whose net worth is under
two million dollars and to corporations or organizations, including labor
organizations, that do not exceed a $7,000,000 net worth and do not have
more than 500 employees.'0 The Board does not have records indicating
how many potential EAJA proceedings could have arisen from NLRB
107. Even when a court found that the General Counsel had dismissed a charge incor-
rectly because he had erred as to Section 10(b) time limits, the court did not order com-
plaint issuance, but instead ordered the General Counsel to proceed with the investiga-
tion. See Southern California Dist. Council of Laborers v. Ordman, 318 F. Supp. 633, 636
(C.D. Cal. 1970).
108. See STANLEY R. STRAUSS & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 169-77 (5th ed. 1996)
(discussing the eligibility standard for EAJA).
109. See id. at 170.
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proceedings. Since 1982, however, there have been 345 EAJA applica-
tions to the Board and the courts, out of which 56 or approximately thir-
teen percent have resulted in awards.1 During the same period, the
comparable figures for the Department of Labor were 74 successful
claimants out of 177 applications, or forty-one percent."
Two policies-the General Counsel's credibility policy and investiga-
tive cooperation as a "special circumstance"-play a significant role in
EAJA litigation. The General Counsel has a standard for determining
when to issue complaints in cases in which the alleged unfair labor prac-
tice vel non depends on credibility, that is, where one party alleges that
something happened and the other party argues that it did not. Because
the unfair labor practice issue in such a case depends on who is credited,
General Counsels have directed Regional Offices to exhaust investiga-
tive efforts that may provide objective evidence upon which a credibility
assessment can be made. Where that evidence is not available, the Gen-
eral Counsel's policy is to issue a complaint and leave the credibility de-
termination to the trier of fact. The Board and EAJA reviewing courts
have generally accepted that policy as a reasonable exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion. 12 Consequently, when the government loses a case be-
cause of an adverse credibility determination, the prosecution will usu-
ally be found to be "substantially justified."
Similarly, General Counsels have successfully argued that failure to
cooperate in an investigation is a "special circumstance [which would]
make an [EAJA] award unjust."'' 3 Simply stated, a party cannot refuse
to tell the investigator its side of the story and then claim EAJA fees for
110. It is important to note that while the Board does not maintain records on the net
worth of parties to the cases, the number of proceedings in which the General Counsel
finds merit exceeds 10,000 every year. It would thus not be unreasonable to estimate the
potential EAJA proceedings as being in the thousands. See infra Part IV.E.3 (discussing
the Merit Factor).
111. See HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERV. Div., GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO NO. B-278335, GAO/HEHS-98-58R, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACr: ITS
USE IN SELECTED AGENCIES 5 (1998). The report also included a review of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, but since that agency does not have administra-
tive authority to award EAJA fees, its experience is irrelevant for a comparison with the
Board.
112. Compare Wolf Street Supermarkets, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 665, 666-67 (1983) (de-
nying a claim for attorneys fees even though the evidence supporting the charge was
deemed incredible), and Charter Management, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 169, 169-70 (1984) (de-
nying a claim for attorneys fees even though the evidence supporting the charge was
deemed incredible), with Phil Smidt & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir.
1987) (awarding attorneys fees on the basis that the Board's conclusion was not substan-
tially justified).
113. See Lion Uniform, 285 N.L.R.B. 249, 253 & n.32 (1987).
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litigation when its story is later accepted in litigation and the case dis-
missed. Again, while the experience with EAJA applications does not
provide a definitive basis for assessing the success or failure of section
3(d) and its implementation, the record certainly reflects favorably on
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by General Counsels.
3. The Merit Factor
A third area of this assessment composite of section 3(d) is the merit
factor; that is, the percentage of unfair labor practice cases which, after
investigation, the General Counsel deems worthy of prosecution. Year
in and year out, in tight budget years or in bad, with Republican as well
as Democratic General Counsels, the merit factor hovers at around
thirty-five percent. In other words about thirty-five percent of the cases
present sufficient evidence to warrant litigation while sixty-five percent
do not. The consistency of this statistic reflects the evenhandedness with
which General counsels have applied section 3(d). No General Counsel
has ever set a merit factor goal of thirty-five percent. Sometimes the fac-
tor for a given year may be thirty-three or thirty-six percent. But most
importantly, it hovers at about the same place regardless of the identity
of the General Counsel, clearly indicating a regularity in prosecutorial
policy among General Counsels.
114
What about the sixty-five percent of the 40,000 or so cases filed every
year that are dismissed, that is, those that are found unworthy of prose-
cution? In a way, indeed, in a very effective way, such section 3(d) deci-
sions of the General Counsel or his agents resolves those labor disputes
too. Parties are told very early in the dispute by an independent public
prosecutor that their case lacks merit. They may not like the result, but
they have a decision without the possibility of endless appeals.
114. There is a connection between this consistent merit factor and the General Coun-
sel's "time target" system. Prior to 1960 and the development of the time target system as
we know it today, the Board was notorious for its casehandling delays. Senator John F.
Kennedy, in a 1959 speech before the Allegheny Bar Association in Pittsburgh, likened an
NLRB case to Charles Dickens's case, Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, contained in Bleak House.
See Joseph E. DeSio & John E. Higgins, Jr., The Management and Control of Case Han-
dling, Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, 2 BUREAUCRAT 385 (1974). Although Gen-
eral Counsels had time targets for case processing before this speech, Kennedy's accusa-
tion prompted General Counsel Stuart Rothman to institute a system of measurement of
case-handling performance that continues, with some recent variations, to this day. See id.
at 385, 390. This post-1960 emphasis on expedition resulted in an increase in the merit fac-
tor from a fairly consistent 20% to the 35% discussed above. In other words, the sooner
the investigative staff completed an investigation, the more likely the case would be
deemed worthy of prosecution.
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To assure uniformity and quality in the decisions of Regional Offices
not to prosecute, General Counsels maintain an Office of Appeals. This
office considers appeals from charging parties who are dissatisfied with
the dismissal decisions of Regional Directors. It is comprised of dedi-
cated professionals who view their roles not as defenders of Regional Di-
rectors, but as protectors of the system. They handle approximately
3,000 appeals a year, with a fairly consistent reversal rate of three to five
percent annually. Such a consistency also reflects an evenhandedness in
General Counsel decisions.
4. Settlement Policy and Practice
The fourth area in the composite is the settlement rate-the percent-
age of merit cases that are settled without the necessity of litigation. For
most of the past twenty years, that figure has exceeded ninety percent,
which reflects at least in part, a willingness of parties to accept the Gen-
eral Counsel's decision in unfair labor practice cases. The settlement
rate is clearly affected by the costs of litigation, but this is only part of the
reason for the success of the General Counsel's settlement program. No
organization could maintain such a high settlement rate without a gen-
eral acknowledgment by the bar that prosecutorial decisions are gener-
ally made in a reasonable fashion with due regard for the rights of the
parties and consistency with Board law.
F. The Division of Operations-Management
The Division of Operations-Management is composed of the Regional
Offices and a Headquarters Staff. Well over ninety percent of the cases
filed with the Agency are resolved in the Regional Offices without any
Washington involvement. The fine record of these Regional Offices
during the Board's sixty-three-year history is the grist for another paper.
What is important here is that General Counsels have maintained an ef-
fective system for assuring consistency among the Board's thirty-three
Regional Offices. The key to that system continues to be the Division's
Headquarters' Staff. The Staff monitors and supervises the General
Counsel's Case Management Program (time targets), the General Coun-
sel's Quality Control Program, and the General Counsel's personnel and
management policies.
The Case Management Program is described elsewhere,'15 and it would
only serve to unduly lengthen this paper to describe it here. Suffice it to
say that it is a system designed to measure and manage agency case-
115. See DeSio & Higgins, supra note 114, at 387-94.
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handling that has been labeled an "Exemplary Practice in Federal Pro-
ductivity.".. 6 It has resulted in more than ninety percent of the Agency's
unfair labor practices being resolved in the Regional Offices in a median
time of under fifty days."7
In conjunction with this "time target" program, the Division also con-
ducts a quality control program. Under this program, a statistically
sound number of cases handled by the Regional Offices, which would not
otherwise have been reviewed by Headquarters' Staff, are selected, re-
viewed, evaluated, and then discussed with the Regional Office involved.
A recent audit of this system by the Inspector General's staff, with the
author serving as the Board's Acting Inspector General, characterized
the system as one from which General Counsels can take reasonable as-
surance as to the quality of the work being performed in the Regional
Offices."8
V. CONCLUSION
Fifty years have passed since Taft-Hartley. During that period, section
3(d) General Counsels and their staffs have prosecuted thousands of
cases and handled hundreds of thousands more. The early years evi-
denced some difficulties in the relationship with the Board, but the past
thirty-five to forty years have proven the wisdom of section 3(d). The
section 3(d) authority delegated to General Counsels has generally been
used wisely and effectively and it is to the career staff that most of the
credit is due. Their efforts over 50 years, together with Section 3(d)
"final authority," have served the Board, the parties, and the nation very
well.
If as they say, the past is prologue, we can expect some efforts now and
then to amend 3(d) to make the General Counsel's decisions not to
prosecute appealable. UFCW put the issue to rest as a statutory matter,
but the issue can always be raised anew. If it is, I hope that such an effort
is unsuccessful. As recently as last summer, federal district court Judge
Stanley Sporkin commented on the need to find some way to reduce the
116. See WORKFORCE EFFECTIVENESS & DEV. GROUP, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT, WPR-10, CASE MANAGEMENT IN NLRB's OFFICE OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL (1980).
117. See id. at 4. In recent years, budget and staffing constraints have caused slippage
in the traditional time records of the Board. However, the system continues to provide
the information necessary to manage approximately 34,000 cases filed every year in the
most effective and efficient means possible under the circumstances.
118. Review of the Quality Control Program Over Casehandling, Audit Report of the
Office of the Inspector General, NLRB (OIG-AMR-16).
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burden of personnel litigation in the courts.119 He suggested some gate-
keeping mechanism for making merit calls in employment matters, in-
cluding discrimination cases. Otherwise, Judge Sporkin argued federal
district court judges run the risk of being employment czars. Sporkin
suggested section 3(d) be used as a model for such a mechanism.
Judge Sporkin's remarks bring to mind the suggestion some years ago
of former NLRB Chairman Edward Miller that there be a new statutory
provision-section 8(a)(6)-to cover wrongful discharge cases. Mr.
Miller's proposal also involved replacing the NLRB with labor courts but
retaining section 3(d).
What would happen to the floodgate of employment litigation if Con-
gress were to choose the General Counsel or some other "labor or em-
ployment czar" as an independent prosecutor? It is premature to suggest
that the merit factor would be the same for these cases as it has been for
early cases. But it would certainly be an effective and responsible device
for reducing litigation while at the same time giving parties an opportu-
nity to have their cases considered by an independent public prosecutor.
119. See Gerald D. Skoning, Federal Judiciary Reluctant Personnel Czar, CHI. TRIB.,
July 3, 1997, § 1, at 23.
120. See id.
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